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Regulation of abortion has long been the primary way that law measures the interest that society has in “potential life” and the rights and responsibilities that pregnant people have in conjunction with or in opposition to that state interest. To the extent that abortion law hinges on beliefs about prenatal life, it is crucial to recognize the many ways that law subordinates the interests of pregnant women —interests in autonomy, equality, and more — to lives that can only be sustained through the bodies of others. Thus, pregnant people are uniquely burdened and constrained, even more so than actual parents, not just in accessing abortion but through other systems that sanction the conscription of unwilling pregnant bodies to satisfy a state interest in potential life at all stages of pregnancy. This paper considers the reproductive justice implications of the law’s singular focus on potential life and the concomitant choice to erase the actual lives of pregnant women and others.